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Abstract 
In the Western Congo Basin, the Tri-National Dja Odzala Minkebe (TRIDOM) Landscape covers 178000 
km² in south-east Cameroon, north-east Gabon, and north-west Republic of Congo. Almost 97% is 
covered by tropical rainforest and is globally important for the conservation of large mammals (elephants, 
gorillas, chimpanzees). TRIDOM is also an emerging iron ore province with 9 iron ore deposits currently 
being explored. Mining and associated infrastructure will, under a business as usual scenario, lead to the 
widespread fragmentation of this forest landscape. Developing these projects with no-net loss or net gain 
biodiversity objectives as a condition for access to finance offers opportunities but a landscape-level 
approach is needed to take into account, and mitigate, indirect and cumulative impacts. There are 
numerous technical challenges and policy implications to this as the development and implementation of 
a landscape-scale vision for conservation and development in the TRIDOM requires coordinated efforts 
by various sectors of government and mining companies, and legal and financial tools to secure long-term 
land-use rights across the various interacting sectors. In this context, there are lessons to be learned from 
the TRIDOM for other biodiversity-rich landscapes faced with large-scale land-based investments in 
mining, oil & gas or agro-industrial sectors. 
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Introduction 
Countries aspiring to become emerging economies are generally proactive in organizing the exploitation 
of their natural resources so as to achieve their broader economic and social development goals (Laurance 
et al. 2014a, Edwards et al. 2014, Meyfroidt et al. 2014). As a result, they often welcome large land-based 
investments in natural resources, including agriculture, forestry, minerals and oil and gas projects, among 
others. The expansion of soja in South America (Grau & Aide 2008) or oil palm in SE Asia, and now 
central Africa (Feintrenie 2014), highlight the intensity and speed of this land-use change dynamic. As a 
result, large areas of natural habitats are being converted, frequently with severe environmental, socio-
economic and health impacts as humans move into previously sparsely populated lands (Edwards et al. 
2014, Laurance et al. 2014b, Caro et al. 2014). In central Africa, pervasive poverty, competition for 
commercial land contracts, and road-building are threatening the last extensive forest areas and their 
biodiversity (Wilkie et al. 2000, Megevand 2013).  
 
Protected areas play a key role in reducing these impact, as they are one of the few land use management 
options that have shown can halt and even reverse the loss of wildlife and biodiversity, even if many 
parks are still paper parks, and protected areas are also subject to downgrading, downsizing, and 
degazettement mostly for access to land and the use of natural resources (Mascia & Pailler, 2011). 
Protected Areas alone will thus not halt biodiversity loss at the global scale (Hanski 2011,, Lindenmayer 
& Franklin 2002, Lindenmayer et al. 2006). The importance of the wider landscape in conservation is 
acknowledged by academics, practitioners and at international policy levels (Sayer et al. 2013). The 
Convention on Biological Diversity’s Aïchi Target 11 thus states that protected areas networks need to be 
“(…) integrated into the wider landscapes and seascapes”. The conservation of biodiversity must be 
integrated into land-use decisions well beyond the limits of designated protected areas. 
 
Outside protected areas, encouraging inward investment while striking a sound balance between different 
interests, respecting the legal and customary rights of local populations and conserving biodiversity 
represents a major challenge (Garcia et al. 2010). A key obstacle is the absence of effective land use 
planning at the national or regional level and poor coordination between sectors, with the forestry, 
agricultural, infrastructure, urban development, and extractive sectors largely operating independently of 
each other. The challenge lies in identifying policy instruments that are able to govern land use changes 
resulting from economic development in a manner that results in no net loss of biodiversity while 
engaging land-users in conservation (Opdam et al. 2013). Biodiversity offset mechanisms are one 
candidate for such an instrument.  
  
Investments and development activities will have negative impacts on biodiversity, even when all 
measures are taken to prevent, reduce and restore environmental damage. Biodiversity offset are a 
mechanism whereby developers operating in an area undertake or fund measurable conservation 
operations whose outcomes fully compensate for these residual (adverse) impacts. Current policies 
usually permit the uncompensated or poorly-compensated loss of natural habitat (Brownlie et al. 2013). 
Poor implementation and weak governance further worsen this trend. Policies (i) that require rigorous 
application of prior impact mitigation steps for proposed development projects in addition to clear, 
quantified offsets or compensation for residual losses of biodiversity, and (ii) underpinned by limits to 
what can be offset (as recommended by the BBOP Standard of 2012) are an improvement over policies 
that do not consider these steps adequately. Policies also need to set measurable biodiversity goals to the 
development of appropriate mitigation measures before permitting development projects, and these goals 
need enforcement.  
 
The loss of rainforest is an emerging issue in the Congo Basin (Scholes & Biggs 2010). These forests are 
some of Earth’s wildest areas (Sanderson et al. 2002). They are globally outstanding for their biodiversity 
and the level of threat was comparatively low compared to other eco-regions in Africa. They have been 
relatively well preserved up to now due to low demographic pressure, limited accessibility, poor 
infrastructure, low impact logging and rural exodus (Burgess et al. 2006, Megevand 2013). But, 
deforestation in the Central African region has increased in recent years, with a deforestation rate moving 
from 0.13% between 1990 and 2000 to 0.26% between 2000 and 2005 (Ernst et al. 2013). Even though 
climate change will have an increasing impact, land use change, in particular forest conversion, will 
remain the major driver of environmental change in the region (Dawson et al. 2011). The 21st century 
will thus mark a transition for the forests of the Congo Basin, as they enter the anthropocene. And the role 
of large-scale investments from agro-business, mining and infrastructure suggests biodiversity offsets can 
play a critical role in shaping the futures of these forests. 
 
In this paper, we explore how large land-based investments could affect Central Africa’s forest 
landscapes, and discuss offsets as a possible solution to manage those impacts. Finally, we draw lessons 
which could be applied to other biodiversity-rich landscapes faced with large-scale land-based 
investments. 
 
The challenge of no net loss 
No net loss goals are increasingly being set by governments (ten Kate & Crowe 2014) as well as 
companies (Rainey et al. 2014). Financial institutions are becoming increasingly aware of biodiversity 
  
issues when investing in projects, both as a contribution to the CBD objectives under the “global 
compact” and as risk management strategies. They realize negative environmental and biodiversity 
impacts pose operational and legal risks but also tarnishes their image and have ethical implications. 
Biodiversity offsets are one mechanism used to reduce these risks, and to ensure and be able to 
convincingly demonstrate that no net loss of biodiversity results from the activities they finance (Doswald 
et al. 2012). The World Bank itself is in the process of updating its environmental safeguards. 
 
Among financial institutions, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) has the most widely used set of 
standards to address biodiversity risks. Its Performance Standard 6 (PS6) has been taken up by private 
banks gathered under the Equator Principles. Together, they cover over 70% of private debts in emerging 
economies (Rainey et al. 2014). Among its objectives, PS6 aims to ensure that projects do not cause a net 
loss of biodiversity values in natural habitats, and generate a net gain in “critical habitats” that harbor 
particularly threatened biodiversity. This can then be counted as a contribution to the broader objective of 
restoring threatened biodiversity (Brownlie & Botha 2009). Abundant guidance is provided on how no net 
loss and net gain can be achieved, with the mitigation hierarchy as a central concept. Under this hierarchy, 
impacts on biodiversity must be avoided and reduced; temporary impacts require restoration; and any 
residual impacts must be offset to achieve no net loss (NNL) or a net gain (NG) of the affected 
biodiversity values.  
 
Conformity with PS6 requires project proponents to prepare a Biodiversity Action Plan and/or 
Management Plan describing how these various steps will be implemented, the expected outcomes, and 
the associated monitoring and reporting. Developers seeking to comply with PS6 requirements are 
therefore looking for operational solutions to achieve NNL/NG goals, and particularly on the tricky issue 
of offsetting residual impacts. A community of practice has developed around the issue, in which the 
Business and Biodiversity Offsets Program (BBOP) has played a key role since it was established in 2004 
(Benabou 2014). BBOP currently has a membership of over 75 organizations that include financial 
institutions, conservation organizations, companies from the extractives, civil engineering and agricultural 
sectors, as well as specialist service-providers who are competent in the design, execution and/or auditing 
of biodiversity offsets and action/management plans. 
 
In 2012, BBOP published a standard on biodiversity offsets which offers the following definition of 
offsets as “measurable conservation outcomes resulting from actions designed to compensate for 
significant residual adverse biodiversity impacts arising from project development after appropriate 
prevention and mitigation measures have been taken”. Furthermore, “the goal of biodiversity offsets is to 
  
achieve no net loss and preferably a net gain of biodiversity on the ground with respect to species 
composition, habitat structure, ecosystem function and people’s use and cultural values associated with 
biodiversity”. While biodiversity offsets are defined here in terms of specific development projects (such 
as a road or a mine), they could also be used to compensate for the broader effects of programs and plans 
(BBOP 2012). 
In this paper, we use the BBOP standard to guide our analysis of the options available to balance large 
land-based development in the forest landscapes of central Africa with the conservation of its unique 
biodiversity values. We use the forest landscape of the TRIDOM to illustrate this. 
 
The forest landscape of the TRIDOM 
In north-east Gabon, north-west Congo, and south-east Cameroon, the 178,000 km² Dja – Minkebe - 
Odzala forest landscape, or TRIDOM,  is among the most intact and wildlife rich forests left in the Congo 
Basin (De Wachter et al. 2009). Vast areas are uninhabited, while Bantu and Ba’ka (pygmy) people live 
in scattered villages along the few roads. Overall population density is around 1 inhabitant/km² and rural 
livelihoods are based on subsistence agriculture, fishing and hunting, artisanal gold mining and cocoa 
farming. Almost 97% of TRIDOM is lowland tropical rainforest; 24% is gazetted as a protected area and 
around 60 % is attributed to logging concessions.  
 
The TRIDOM is also an emerging iron ore province and at least 8 companies are currently involved in 
preparing mining projects. The Mbalam-Nabeba project (Sundance Resources) is ready for development, 
pending the necessary $4.5 billion needed to fund initial investments. Most of these projects are situated 
in the thinly populated “interzone” between protected areas. It is feared that the needed infrastructure 
(railroads, roads, transmission lines) and the associated indirect and cumulative impacts (especially from 
the influx of population) will lead to the demise of TRIDOM as a continuous forest landscape, and reduce 
it progressively to a set of vulnerable and isolated protected areas, unable to conserve their key features 
which are dependent on large scale ecosystem processes.  
 
Two of the mining companies, Sundance Resources and IMIC (Nkout iron ore deposit in Cameroon) have 
already indicated that they will apply the performance standards of the International Finance Corporation, 
and in particular PS6 on biodiversity and natural resources. One driver of this commitment is possible 
funding by Equator Principles Banks (e.g. Standard Bank of South Africa which has been appointed as 
non-exclusive lead debt arranger for Sundance’s project). The TRIDOM interzone is most likely a 
“critical habitat” under the IFC performance standard, not least because it contains critically endangered 
species (western lowland gorilla), endangered species (chimpanzee) and regionally endangered species 
  
(forest elephants). In addition TRIDOM, as one of the least populated extensive forest landscapes in the 
Congo Basin, is a unique ecosystem that also exhibits key evolutionary processes. Access to Equator 
Principles Banks’ finance for projects in this area will require the proponents to demonstrate a net gain for 
a number of biodiversity values. How this might actually be achieved is a real challenge. Most likely, 
projects will need to design and undertake biodiversity offsets that provide positive conservation 
outcomes over and beyond the residual impacts that can be attributed to the projects.  
 
Applying the mitigation hierarchy in the TRIDOM 
At the scale of the TRIDOM, the planned mines have limited footprints. For example, Sundance 
Resources estimates 20 km² of direct deforestation for the needs of Nabeba’s mine and railroad (in 
Congo). As is often the case, the lurking dangers are the indirect and cumulative impacts of mining and 
infrastructure development in TRIDOM. In fact, the “resource corridor” approach that has been heralded 
by development banks like the World Bank and the African Development Bank as a catalyst model to 
boost economic growth in Africa could pose serious problem with regard to managing cumulative impact 
on biodiversity and the maintenance of ecosystem services.  
 
A key measure for the application of PS6 is therefore to avoid the creation of new permanent settlement 
in previously uninhabited or little inhabited areas. Avoiding the hassle and costs of having to deal with 
pioneer settlements in the vicinity of their projects is an advantage for mining companies, and allows 
them to direct development initiatives to the existing towns and villages, thus benefiting local 
communities rather than pioneer settlements. This means that mining base camps, for example, should 
operate according to an offshore model, with workers’ families residing in existing towns. Access roads 
should also be considered as private roads and closed to settlement or private traffic. As an example, the 
65 km road build in Congo by Core Mining to access their Avima deposit has already led to immigration 
of artisanal gold miners and associated traders (1900 people of which only 10% are Congolese). Some of 
them are engaged in illegal activities involving bush-meat hunting and elephant poaching for ivory. This 
could have been avoided by strictly controlling access along the Avima road, and is a situation that has 
been complicated by unclear government policies on the use of such new roads. Given the scale of 
infrastructure development plans in the TRIDOM, this issue has to be clarified while it is still 
manageable. 
 
Offset opportunities 
In spite of these efforts, and if projects do go ahead, there will most likely be residual impacts to be offset. 
Large pristine ecosystems such as the TRIDOM landscape are an extreme context in which to consider 
  
the applicability of biodiversity offsets, and the achievability of NNL and NG objectives (Pilgrim et al. 
2013). 
 
Assessing the feasibility of achieving no net loss goals and the limits to the impacts that can be offset is a 
key principle in the BBOP standard. Time-lags, uncertainties and risks relating to restoration success 
could lead to a net loss of biodiversity (Maron et al., 2013) and this is a major risk to the use of offsets to 
achieve NNL/NG goals in the TRIDOM. For example, Curran et al. (2014) argue that because old growth 
habitats cannot be restored within reasonable time frames, offsets will lead to a net loss of biodiversity no 
matter how. However, mining projects have a limited footprint which may mean that only a limited area 
of high value old growth forest will be impacted. Logging and agro-industrial plantations (especially 
rubber, in Cameroon) are much bigger threats to protection of old growth forests, and offsets offer the 
opportunity to ensure protection of 'threatened habitats, and thus produce a net gain in the total acreage of 
protected old growth. 
 
Through conservation set-asides, the mining projects could contribute to the expansion of protected areas 
in the TRIDOM, thus increasing the area of forest under effective protection. Sundance Resources’ 
Mbalam project in Cameroon has already established a 1640 km² “conservation concession” and 
Sundance indicates willingness for a 2000 km² set aside for its Congolese Nabeba project. To be 
considered as offsets, such set-asides raise complex technical issues around their additionnality, especially 
given low background rates of deforestation under current land-uses in the TRIDOM (Mosnier et al. 
2014). Future scenarios, however, clearly point towards their dramatic increase, providing a clear 
rationale for investing in conserving existing and interconnected old growth forests blocs. Therefore, at 
the project-level a no net loss outcome can be achieved through “averted loss offsets”. The key 
requirement is that losses from the project are independent of the background rate of biodiversity loss. To 
put it simply, in landscapes where all development projects and other activities with impacts on 
biodiversity are required to achieve no net loss, there is no – or most likely a low - background rate of 
loss, and averted loss offsets are generally not appropriate (Quétier et al. 2015). In addition to 
contributing to an increase in the area of forest under protection or sustainable resource use, averted-loss 
offsets must also be chosen so as to contribute to ecological connectivity, thereby ensuring the robustness 
of large-scale ecological processes which are one of the key ecological features of the TRIDOM 
landscape in its current form. 
 
An alternative to averted-loss offsets would be for mining companies to fund ecological restoration of 
degraded forests, outside their direct footprints. The TRIDOM interzone suffers from intense elephant 
  
poaching (Maisels et al. 2013), driven by high prices for ivory (Wittemyer et al. 2014). The mining 
projects could fund anti-poaching capacity, thus stopping and eventually reversing elephant population 
decline, and provide economic incentives linked to conservation or sustainable use to the communities 
close to key wildlife habitat and the mining areas. This could benefit not only many species such as great 
apes, African soft-shell turtles, mandrills, pangolins, leopards, and the last hippos remaining in the Ivindo 
river Basin, but also highly significant forest regeneration processes as the elephant is a keystone species, 
having a critical role in the dispersal of forest seeds (Beaune et al. 2003). There are other avenues for 
enhancing the biodiversity value of degraded forests, by targeting on-going sources of degradation, 
habitat characteristics, or species of concern (e.g. through reintroductions as discussed by King et al. 
2014). In essence, degraded forests, especially those emptied of their large fauna, can be restored and 
provide positive conservation outcomes that can offset some of the losses associated with large-scale 
land-based investments.  
 
A dual strategy of achieving gains via averted loss and restoration actions could be appropriate in the 
TRIDOM as the forests of the TRIDOM still offer tremendous scope for protecting large areas of largely 
natural habitat and this opportunity should not be missed. However protection and restoration are 
combined, appropriate metrics and exchange rules will have to be developed in order to demonstrate that 
no net loss or net gain objectives are achievable, and achieved (Quétier & Lavorel 2011). These would 
probably include some form of biodiversity or conservation credits, as is being discussed in Gabon under 
the country’s 2014 Sustainable Development law. In addition, for averted-loss offsets, agreements on the 
baselines of biodiversity against which gains and losses are to be assessed will need to be reached (Bull et 
al. 2014, Gordon et al. 2015). Similar difficulties have been raised by the REDD process which 
assimilates avoided deforestation and forest degradation to green-house gas sequestration (see Karsenty & 
Ongolo 2012 for a discussion in the context of Cameroon). 
 
The institutional challenge of ensuring long-lasting success 
Successful implementation of offsets requires innovation in solving serious institutional, legal and 
financial challenges (IUCN 2014). As well as their ecological and economic dimensions, processes must 
be in place for validating offset designs and implementation, and transferring offset liabilities tied to 
particular projects (e.g. in case projects are bought or sold). A key requirement for offset implementation 
is the design of legally binding obligations around ecological outcomes. This can be achieved through 
licenses or contracts such as performance management contracts where payments are conditioned on 
achieving ecological performance targets within an agreed time frame (with appropriate, independent, 
oversight). 
  
 
On the ground, long term protection of offset gains can be provided through leases and contractual 
provisions (as in so-called “conservation concessions” – Sandker et al. 2011). Moreover, land can be 
committed to conservation purposes, through covenants, servitudes or easements if such legal tools exist, 
or through designation in binding planning documents, such as gazetting as protected areas. Long term 
financial capacity can be guaranteed through insurance, performance bonds and trust funds. Such 
instruments are used in many countries with established “conservation banking” mechanisms, and mining 
companies are familiar with such requirements concerning rehabilitation and decommissioning. Trust 
Funds can be used to aggregate funding from developers and facilitate its delivery to restoration in 
countries with low institutional capacity for establishing offset mechanisms (Spergel & Taïeb 2008). In 
the region, the Tri-Sangha foundation (Fondation Tri-Nationale de la Sangha) offers a good model for 
the establishment of such as fund. In any case, support from local communities is crucial. As with all 
conservation programs, careful attention needs to be paid to the human dimensions of biodiversity when 
designing and implementing biodiversity offsets. This is a key principle of the BBOP standard. 
 
Conclusions 
Going beyond project-by-project approaches to mitigating environmental impacts is getting increased 
attention worldwide, in particular as companies and governments devise ways to apply biodiversity-
related performance standards in ways that are cost-effective and ensure that the resources allocated to 
biodiversity through the mitigation hierarchy actually contribute to long-term conservation goals. 
 
In the TRIDOM, if all mining projects were to contribute to significant conservation set asides, wildlife 
conservation activities and forest restoration programs, this could be a game changer for biodiversity’s 
short- and long-term prospects in the area. As in many other instances, a landscape-level approach is 
needed to take into account, and mitigate, indirect and cumulative impacts from large land-based 
investments and development opportunities. The development and implementation of a landscape-scale 
vision for conservation and development in the TRIDOM requires coordinated efforts by various sectors 
of government and mining companies, e.g. through land-use planning and strategic environmental 
assessments, as well as the development of legal and financial tools to secure land-use rights across the 
various interacting sectors (mining, oil & gas, forests, agriculture, conservation, etc.).  
Governments will need to contribute actively to such a process, especially since land-use rights are 
typically granted through sector-specific concessions that have varying requirements in terms of 
biodiversity and rural livelihoods. It remains unknown whether such willingness will emerge in the region 
(Ongolo 2015), but the prospect of ensuring adequate solutions are available for large-scale land-based 
  
investments to conform to lender requirements – including offset opportunities - can provide strong 
incentives to governments to develop national offset policies (Kormos et al. 2014). Long-term success 
will, however, require enduring political will, backed up by public concern. 
 
As with any policy, the right institutional arrangements and oversight mechanisms must be put in place to 
ensure effective implementation, and in this case for offsets to be conducive to no net loss (McKenney & 
Kiesecker 2010; Van Teeffelen et al. 2014). Arranging long-term protection and financing arrangements 
for offsets will require close collaboration between financial institutions, mining companies and various 
sectors of government. Such collaboration could lead to aggregated offsets whereby several developers 
pool resources to set-up larger offset actions that are more effective, easier to monitor and enforce, and 
therefore longer lasting. The World Bank is exploring aggregated offsets in countries such as 
Mozambique and Liberia. Conservation Trust Funds are another well-tested solution to the challenge of 
effectively offsetting residual impacts.  
 
In the context of Africa’s forest landscapes, biodiversity offsets offer an opportunity for the private sector 
to contribute to the conservation of large extents of threatened old growth forests by strengthening 
protected area networks that are desperately underfunded (Pilgrim & Bennun 2014), and by contributing 
to conservation actions in the broader landscape that is urgently needed to avoid a widespread empty 
forest syndrome (Wilkie et al. 2011). In this context, there are lessons to be learned for other biodiversity-
rich landscapes faced with large-scale land-based investments in mining, oil & gas or agro-industrial 
sectors. 
 
Given the current status quo of biodiversity loss which is rarely or not adequately mitigated and 
compensated, biodiversity offsets, undertaken within a rigorous application of the mitigation hierarchy, 
provide a useful framework to envisage balancing development and conservation goals. While no net loss 
will be very challenging to achieve in most cases (Gardner et al. 2013), and particularly in Africa’s forest 
landscapes, it provides a framework to drive better mitigation – including avoidance, minimization and 
offsets. Effective application of the mitigation hierarchy aiming for net gain could have huge impact, 
including by the protection of threatened old growth forest. Time is running out however, as there is much 
pressure to log the last unprotected old growth forest that remain or convert them to other uses.  
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